UNIVERSIDADE DE SANTIAGO DE COMPOSTELA

FACULTADE DE FILOLOXÍA

GRAO EN LINGUA E LITERATURA INGLESAS 2018/2019

TRABALLO DE FIN DE GRAO

IMPLIED INFORMATION IN LANGUAGE:

A CASE STUDY

MARTA SOUTO CASAL

TITOR: CARLOS ACUÑA FARIÑA

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LIÑA TEMÁTICA ASIGNADA: ANÁLISE DO DISCURSO, LINGÜÍSTICA TEXTUAL E PRAGMÁTICA

SOLICITO a aprobación do seguinte título e resumo:

Título: Implied information in language: A case study.

Resumo [na lingua en que se vai redactar o TFG; entre 1000 e 2000 caracteres]:

The main objective of this study is to analyze the influences of inferences, implicatures and presuppositions in discourse, and to research on the use of implied language in general and how the speakers of the English language in particular make use of it. To investigate on that, it is highly important to take into account the role of context in the interpretation of a message and also the fact that there is too much more information that can be taken from discourse than that which is mentioned explicitly.

In connection with that, I will examine the role of pragmatics in discourse, since its function is to study the relationship between the users of a language and the circumstances of the communication.

This work will be organized in two parts. Firstly, there is going to be a brief explanation of theoretical terms, such as discourse, reference, presupposition, implicature and inference. An attempt will be made to explain the differences among these notions and also to illustrate them with the use of examples. Secondly, this project will have a practical side, in which I am going to apply all those theoretical concepts in real examples so as to show how discourse, and more in particular, implied language, can play a role in everyday life.

Santiago de Compostela, 23 de octubre de 2018

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1. INTRODUCTION: OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

The present study is concerned with the use of implied language in English. One of the aims of this research project is to investigate how Pragmatics can play a very important role in the field of Discourse Analysis. "Pragmatics is a branch of linguistic studies that examines the relationship between the signs and people who use them; that is to say, how and why a specific sign is used by an individual and how do other speakers interpret these signs" (Renkema, 2004: 37).

Why is it so important? Over the years, the importance of the role of the context in the interpretation of a message has been studied and it has been discovered that there is too much more information that can be taken from discourse than which is mentioned explicitly. This is the main role of Pragmatics, and it is closely associated to what this investigation is going to be about.

This project is going to be divided into two parts. First of all, there will be a theoretical part whose aim it is to provide a short introduction to the history of Discourse Analysis and an illustration of some theoretical terms, such as *discourse, pragmatics, reference, inference, implicature, presupposition* and *entailment*, explained by different linguists, such as Austin, Brown and Yule, Grice and Renkema, among others. Within this theoretical part, first, the origins and evolution of Discourse Analysis will be explained, and also the influence of a related discipline, Pragmatics, in the former one. Then, terms such as reference and inference are going to be explained, since understanding them is the basis of the project. To continue, an explanation of the terms mentioned before (*entailment, presupposition* and *implicature*) will be provided, organising them into semantic and pragmatic inferences. In this part, an attempt will be made to establish a distinction among all of them, and to explain the most relevant

features and properties that differentiate ones from others, illustrating them with the use of examples.

Secondly, with a view to tackling the relevance of the theory of implicit language in real life, a case study will be carried, and it will consist of an analysis of parts of the conversations in the American TV series, *Atypical*, which is based on the life of an 18-year-old-boy, Sam Gardner. In this analysis, a distinction will be made among some instances of entailments, presuppositions and implicatures, which are some of the most relevant inference generating mechanisms. By analysing the dialogues in this TV series, it is intended to demonstrate that everything explained in the theoretical part of the project is also applied in real life conversations, since oral examples and, more specifically dialogues, are a clear instance of contexts where implied language can be found more easily. The examples provided in this last part are going to be classified in the same order and following the same arrangement than the theoretical part.

Another main concern of linguists is to investigate on how we communicate with each other and how discourse is ordered to create a well-developed message. Communication is not only connected to words and their conventional meaning, it is also associated with the context in which these words are set and also with the participants' intentions in the communicative exchange.

The topic of implied language seems very interesting to me, since I always wanted to work on how a message can be understood in different ways depending on the background, and how human brains work in such a way that we can understand information that is beyond the literal meaning of the words. This process is quite different if we talk about a computer system, a processor that cannot decipher certain messages if they are not directly -literally- conveyed, and that cannot understand certain

relations between propositions if these propositions are not linked explicitly by the means of, for instance, a conjunctive adjunct such as *therefore*. This project also seeks to better understand real differences between signalled, explicit or marked relations (*He quit the job because he was tired of working long hours)* and unsignalled, implicit or unmarked ones (*He quit the job. He was tired of working long hours*). In the first example, it is directly said (notice the use of *because*) that he quit the job by reason of the long hours. Conversely, in the second example, it is directly said that he was tired of the long hours, but it is not directly said that this was the reason why he quitted the job.

These differences and their explanation will be explained throughout the project, for the main objective of the present document is to analyse through these examples how discourse, and more specifically implied language, can be applied to real examples, focusing on the use of entailments, presuppositions and implicatures. This will -it is hoped- help understand real language use in a more realistic fashion.

2. INTRODUCTION TO DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Discourse Studies is a field that investigates language beyond the sentence level (Tannen, 2007: 5). Therefore, it is necessary to understand the fact that it is the study of language in use and of the inseparability between the form and the purpose of communication. Quite often, the context in which a message is located plays a crucial role for the development and understanding of a message, since there is information surrounding the message that can be understood only with the help of its context. When a speaker says *Could you please close the window?*, the hearer must infer that the speaker does not want to know necessarily whether he has the ability of closing the window or not; it must be presupposed that what he wants the hearer to do is to close the window (because he may be cold or he may be bothered by the noises coming from outside, for instance, although nothing of this is overtly expressed). At the same time, it is deduced that there is an open window in the place where the communicative exchange is maintained. The inseparability between language and context is, therefore, one of the main aspects that have to be taken into account when we talk about Discourse Analysis. It describes patterns of language in texts and establishes a connection between language and its social and cultural context (Paltridge, 2012: 3).

The history of Discourse Analysis is closely related to the disappearance of an ancient discipline: Rhetoric. Rhetoric had a high importance during the Middle Ages; however, it started to lose this relevance during the 19th century, which led to a parallel increase in the study of different fields of humanities and grammar, such as Discourse Analysis (Van Dijk, 1985: 1).

Zellig Harris was the first linguist that introduced the term *Discourse Analysis*, and he described it as "a way of analysing connected speech and writing" (Harris, 1952:

3). He was interested in the connection that the linguistic behaviour has with the non-linguistic one and in examining the role of language beyond the sentence or utterance construction. Thus, he can be known as one of the pioneers of this discipline.

John Langshaw Austin (1962) was one of the precursors of this discipline, together with Paul Grice (1975) and John Searle (1970). He, Austin, investigated the expressions of language and concluded that they might be seen as acts. He established a distinction between three different types of actions:

> We first distinguished a group of things we do in saying something, which together we summed up by saying we perform a locutionary act, which is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference, and which again is roughly equivalent to 'meaning' in a traditional sense. Second, we said that we also perform illocutionary acts such as informing, warning, etc, i.e. utterances which have a certain (conventional force). Thirdly, we may also perform perlocutionary acts: what we bring about or achieve by saying something, such as convincing, persuading, and even say surprising or misleading. (Austin, 1962: 108)

These lines lucidly demonstrate this distinction, which is really interesting since it allows us to establish a connection between the form and meaning of speech acts and to understand the difference between these three types of actions, taking into account that some of them are simply an utterance (locution) and the rest of them go beyond the act of pronouncing a sentence (illocution and perlocution).

As a consequence, locutionary acts, taking into account Austin's Theory of Speech Acts, are those related to the production of speech, with certain marks, words or grammatical rules (Horn and Ward, 2004: 54). An example of locutionary act would be the following: *There is a party tomorrow*. In this sentence the speaker only states a reality about an event. Secondly, illocutionary acts are actions which a speaker realises

at the same time as he utters them. An instance of these kinds of acts is: *I promise that tomorrow I will go out*. By pronouncing this utterance, the speaker is also promising that he will go (which is an extra-linguistic action). Finally, perlocutionary acts have an effect on the addressee; they are realised as a consequence of doing something (convince, threaten, etc). They refer to the effects produced in the hearer. An example would be the following: *He persuaded me to go out tomorrow*- if he goes.

Consequently, Discourse Analysis plays a very important role in the wide field of grammar, since people who analyse discourse have to investigate what language is used for (Brown and Yule, 1983: 1). It can be considered one important branch of grammar that, together with Pragmatics, analyses the role of a message in a particular context. Throughout this project, an attempt will be made to analyse more in depth the role of Pragmatics in Discourse Analysis through examples, and to ascertain that there are much more examples than those we may imagine, since discourse is full of information with one or more implicit messages.

3. THE ROLE OF PRAGMATICS IN DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Once a definition of the term and an explanation of the history of Discourse Studies have been established, another important discipline which needs to be discussed is Pragmatics. The connection between language and the context that surrounds it is called Pragmatics. It studies, as said before, the context-dependent aspects of meaning and it is conventionally taken to have been initiated in 1970 by Morris, Carnap and Peirce (Horn and Ward, 2004: xi).

Some scholars argue that the field of Pragmatics really helps to understand the function of Discourse Analysis, and that they are two closely related disciplines. Cameron argues (2001: 38): "The relationship between linguistic form and communicative function is of central interest in the area of pragmatics and is highly relevant to the field of Discourse Analysis." That is to say, both fields share a common role and it is to study the connection between what it is said and what it is understood. In the example of the window mentioned above, what is said by the speaker is a request for closing the window; nevertheless, what had to be understood by the hearer was, for instance, the fact that the speaker was cold because the window was open.

As a consequence, Pragmatics, since it is the relationship between the meaning and the context, also analyses the boundaries between what is said by the speaker and what is understood by the hearer, which is strongly connected with the following quotation: "Speakers implicate, hearers infer" (Horn and Ward, 2004: 6). Sometimes, the message a hearer deduces is different from what a speaker tends to implicate, as in the previous example. Grice characterised this term to describe examples in which what the speaker means goes beyond the literal message of a sentence (Haugh, 2002: 117)

3.1.The Principle of Local Interpretation

Closely connected to Pragmatics, The Principle of Local Interpretation allows the interlocutor to establish a relation between an utterance and the context that surrounds it. These entities may not have a semantic relation; however, due to this principle, it is easier to draw a connection between them.

> This principle instructs the hearer not to construct a context any larger than he needs to arrive at an interpretation. Thus if he hears someone say 'Shut the door' he will look towards the nearest door available for being shut. (If that door is shut, he may say 'It's shut' rather than consider what other doors are potentially available for being shut (Brown and Yule, 1983: 59).

The following example (*The baby was crying. His mother picked him up*) is formed by two apparently unrelated utterances. If we take each sentence separately, there will not be a clear connection between them; nonetheless, we assume that *him* refers to the baby crying and that his mother picked him up in order for him to stop crying. Therefore, we can draw a connection between the two sentences. Another example would be: *A man and a woman sitting in the living room… the man is bored and goes to the window… goes out… goes to a club.* In this example, we as hearers have to interpret that when the man gets closer to the window he is still in his living room, inside the house; however, the action of going to the club entails the fact of leaving the living room, and even the house. "Knowledge of the world tells us that houses which contain living rooms do not usually contain bars" (Brown and Yule, 1983: 61) In this example it is clearly notorious why and how the context of the message and members of a communicative exchange's shared knowledge are important in the interpretation and understanding of a message.

4. IMPLIED LANGUAGE: INFERENCES AND REFERENCES

Having explained the preliminary concepts related to Discourse Analysis and the study of Pragmatics, it is necessary to explain the main body of the dissertation: the theoretical part related to the use of implied information in English language. First of all, some definitions of the word *implied* will be provided so as to analyse its role into the pragmatic field:

> Suggested but not directly expressed; implicit. (Oxford Dictionary) https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/implied

> If something is implied, it is understood to be true or to exist, although it is not stated directly or in a legal agreement. (Cambridge Dictionary) https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/implied

> Hinted or suggested; not directly expressed. (Collins Dictionary) https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/implied

Thus, what is implied is not literally said by the speaker but rather interpreted by the hearer. That is to say, the speaker simply utters a message that can be understood by the interlocutor in many different ways depending on several factors, such as the way in which the interlocutor communicates the message, the message itself or the context. This is tied to the distinction made before: "Speakers implicate, hearers infer" (Horn and Ward, 2004: 6). Closely related to implied language, the term *inference* appears, holding such an important connection with the former. According to Brown and Yule (1983: 33) people are able to reach a conclusion from a proposition owing to a process of deductive inference. Focusing on the example *It is windy. My umbrella will break* we can infer that both sentences hold a connection and that the fact of being windy will cause the breakup of the umbrella because it would not resist the strength of the wind. Gillian Brown and George Yule (1983: 45) proposed another example focusing on the

fact that one unique sentence could imply more than one message: *Quite often, about a month actually I come up to see my children*. From this message there can be selected several deductive inferences. The first one is that the speaker has children; therefore, he/she cannot be a kid (at least, he is adult enough to have children). The speaker does not live in the same place as his/her children, because it is said that he/she comes to visit them (implying that they do not live together). Furthermore, due to the use of "quite often, about a moth" it is implied that the speaker does not visit his/her children every day. Finally, depending on the age of the speaker, interpretations of that message may vary: if the speaker is 75, then children would live alone since they may be independent; if the speaker is 35, the couple might be divorced, implying that children live either with their mother or with their father. However, the only thing that we can take explicitly from the context is the fact that the speaker goes to see his children quite often. There is another example, quite similar, by Horn and Ward (2004), in which a speaker says: "*My garden is poor this year*". The hearer of this message can interpret via deductive inferences several conclusions from this statement. The first inference could be related to drought or cool weather. It also can be an inference related to the lack of interest and the carelessness of the owner of the garden. These two inferences are not yet confirmed by the speaker, whose only explicit affirmation was that his garden is poor.

According to Imanuddin (2008) inferences can be divided into semantic inferences or pragmatic inferences, although these two groups are not clearly demarcated (some of them can be both semantic and pragmatic). The former ones are those related to the meaning of the utterance, to the lexico-semantic significance. An example of semantic inferences would be the following: *Booth assassinated Lincoln. Lincoln is dead*. This is called *entailment* or *logical consequence*, a term which is going to be object of analysis later on. The other type is pragmatic inferences, which are the

ones related not so much with the semantic part of the clause, but with the context in which a sentence is located, and these are the ones that characterise ordinary uneventful language use in a way that it often becomes even difficult to see them at work (until one tries to make a computer, for instance, understand language). *Presuppositions* and *implicatures* are clear cases in point. Presuppositions are "inferences regarding background assumptions against which the main import of an utterance is assessed and against which the utterance makes sense." (Levinson, 1983: 167) For example, in the following sentence: *How fast were you driving when you got the fine?* it is presupposed that the driver got a fine, probably because he was driving too fast, although that information comes in the subordinate clause.

However, entailments, presuppositions and implicatures will be subject of analysis later on in this project, since they are the most important inference creating mechanisms regarding implicit meaning; an attempt will be made to analyse semantic and pragmatic inferences and to provide more examples of these concepts.

On the other hand, the phenomenon of reference is quite different from that of inference, and it is the following term to be analysed. Flowerdew (2012) included several types of units in English that can be reference items. These items are personal pronouns (e.g. *I, you, she*); demonstratives such as *that, this*, etc; possessive adjectives (*my, yours, hers, their*), the finite article *the*, and finally possessive pronouns, such as *mine* or *yours*. Reference can be defined as "The relationship which holds between words and things is the relationship of reference: words refer to things" (Lyons, 1968: 404). Lyons explains here that a specific word (in speech and in writing) usually has a referent in real life. Starting with this brief quotation on the phenomenon of reference,

the different approaches that authors sustain about this notion will be explained and it is going to be illustrated how they differ from the one quoted before.

To analyse this concept let us utilise the following example:

> My brother Miguel is going to study Chemistry. He is a brilliant student and Chemistry is one of his favourite subjects; therefore, it is going to be very easy for him.

This fragment contains several instances of references. The personal and possessive pronouns *he*, *his* and *him* make reference to *my brother Miguel*, and they coincide in gender (masculine) and person (3rd person singular). If the example was *My sister Marta*, the pronouns used would be *she* and *her* (3rd person singular feminine). Finally, the pronoun *it* refers to the fact of studying Chemistry, because it does not refer to a living creature, unlike my brother Miguel. Brown and Yule (1983) confirmed that one speaker uses different expressions to refer to different individuals. For instance:

> My uncle's coming from Canada on Sunday (…) Oh no they lived in Canada eh he was married to my mother's sister. Well, she's been dead for a number of years ago. (Brown and Yule, 1983: 28)

In this text, as well as in my previous example, the speaker uses the terms *my uncle* and *he* to refer to a different individual than *my mother's sister* and *she*. Therefore, the writer or speaker is the one that refers to something, and not the hearer or reader or the text itself. (Brown and Yule, 1983:28)

Reference, therefore, according to Brown and Yule (1983), would be something external to us. However, these external references are not necessarily tied to our proximities, but rather to any element that we want to refer to, even though it is displaced. This is what Horn and Ward characterised as the phenomenon of *aboutness* (Horn and Ward, 2004: 74). This "displacement" can be either geographical or

temporal. An example of geographical displacement would be talking about the Antarctica, for instance, a place far away from the interlocutor's geographical position. An instance of temporal displacement is to talk about the Middle Ages or the Neolithic, a very remote moment in history. However, there are many different interpretations for the term since some linguists give different meanings, such as "a kind of verbal "pointing to" or "picking out" of a certain object or individual that one wishes to say something about." (Horn and Ward, 2004:76)

According to other linguists such as McGinn (1981), a reference would be the connection between the written/spoken word and the real objects to which references allude to. For instance, a speaker in a conversation says: *"I bought the red book. Could you give it to me?"* In this example, *it* is referring to the red book and it is a written word (a pronoun) that refers to an object in real life (the red book).

Finally, Paltridge (2012: 132) defines a reference as "the situation where the identity of an item can be retrieved from either within or outside the text." He distinguished four types of reference, depending on the situation of the reference itself in a given context. These types are anaphoric, cataphoric, exophoric and homophoric. I proceed to illustrate them in turn:

The first type of references is anaphoric references. These are the ones whose referent is back in the text, "they refer back to another word or phrase used earlier in the text" (Paltridge, 2012: 131). An example of anaphoric reference is the following: *"Adrian is such an intelligent guy that I always learn new things when I see him"*. In this example, *Adrian* is the referent of *him*, and, since it appears before in the text, it is considered an anaphoric reference.

The second example of reference is just the opposite. A cataphoric reference is the one that alludes to an element that appears later in the text. An example of a cataphoric reference is: *She was desperate. The night before she could lot sleep very well and she was very tired. Jane is a bad-tempered woman when she does not sleep more than 9 hours.* In this instance, the pronoun appears before the referent in the text (Jane), who appears later on, specifying who *she* is. As we see, the referent appears after the pronoun, whereas in the first case it is the other way round (the personal pronoun appears after the referent).

Other instances of reference are exophoric references; they "look outside the text to the situation in which the text occurs for the identity of the item being referred to" (Paltridge, 2012: 132). This instance of reference is the one that is much more related to the phenomenon of aboutness explained above. For instance, in *Could I borrow your pencil? I think that I lost mine, I put it on the desk and it disappeared*, both hearer and speaker know the pencil they are talking about; however, it is something that transcends the text boundaries.

Finally, the last instance of reference receives the name of *homophoric reference*. These are defined by Paltridge (2012: 132) and they occur "where the identity of the item can be retrieved by reference to cultural knowledge, in general, rather than the specific context of the text." The following example is a clear case in point: *The Industrial Revolution brought the development of the short story in North America*. The use of the second *the* in this context is not the same as the typical use of the definite article, since in this case it does not refer to a specific short story, but to the literary genre in general. It means that the reader can identify this information easily; it is easily accessible or identifiable.

A follow-up study by Flowerdew (2012) was based on the classification between anaphoric and cataphoric reference as instances of another type of reference (endophoric reference). Endophoric references are those whose referent appears within the text. For example, *Mary took the money and gave it to John.* In these cases, the meanings of the definitions are the same; however, they are seen as subtypes of endophoric references. Halliday and Hasan (1976) also followed this classification.

4.1.Semantic Inferences

As mentioned above, inferences can be divided into semantic inferences and pragmatic inferences. Therefore, a distinction should be made between semantics and pragmatics, for they are two different- yet related- fields of linguistics. On the one hand, semantics is related to the meaning of words, the lexical part. Pragmatics, on the other hand, deals with the use of the expressions in real life in a real context of occurrence; it has a more practical side. In an utterance like the one mentioned before *(Could you close the window?)* a semantic interpretation would be whether the other participant is capable of closing the window. If the hearer ignores the practical side, he would respond "*yes/no*". Nonetheless, what the speaker is meaning is that he wants the other participant to close the window. The pragmatics in this utterance would be the act of closing the window by the hearer.

The following concern will be to deal with semantic inferences, a message which is deduced or inferred due to the semantic part of language. According to some authors, such as Saeed (1997) or Lafi (2008), *entailments* are the most obvious cases of semantic inferences. An entailment is a logical consequence or logical implication compounded by an entailing sentence and an inferred sentence. An example of entailment is the

following: *Shakespeare wrote Hamlet. Hamlet is a play written by Shakespeare.* The entailing sentence is the first one (*Shakespeare wrote Hamlet*) and *Hamlet is a play written by Shakespeare* is the inferred sentence, which is not directly expressed.

Entailments represent a truth-relation, as Lafi (2008) and Saeed (1997) argued. The truth of the entailing sentence guarantees the truth of the inferred sentence (if one is true the other one must be true as well), and, in the previous case, the falsity of the first also signifies the falsity of the second one. Anderson et al. (1971) characterised them as 'the heart of logic', 'natural deduction' and 'intuitionistic implication'. Going back to the previous example, the statement that Shakespeare wrote *Hamlet* (which is a true assertion) implies the truth of the sentence that *Hamlet* was written by Shakespeare. If the first sentence was false (supposing that Shakespeare did not write *Hamlet*), then *Hamlet* would not be a play by Shakespeare either (implying the falsity of the second statement).

There are several cases in which entailments can occur. One of them (as in the case above) is active-passive syntactic constructions. In these constructions the syntactic order and the verb tense changes; however, the semantics is the same. Another example of active-passive entailment is *Martin fixed the table that Charles had broken. The table that had been broken by Charles was fixed by Martin*. As mentioned before, both sentences mean the same and one entails the other.

Another case of entailments are paraphrase constructions (Saeed, 1997: 100), for they mutually entail one another. These, as the example above, are sentences that have the same meaning but a different construction; although a paraphrase construction conveys the same meaning than another one, they use different expressions or different words to code that meaning. An example is the following one: *Brutus, Cassius and*

Casca assassinated Caesar. Caesar died. (Lafi, 2008: 3). In this case, the inferred sentence semantically alludes to the fact that somebody died, which connects to the entailing sentence that somebody assassinated someone else. Another inferred conclusion would be that Brutus, Cassius and Casca killed somebody.

In this case, the truth of the entailing sentence guarantees the truth of the inferred sentence and the falsity of the second means the falsity of the first one (if Caesar is alive the first statement could not be true, since they would not have assassinated him). Since *kill* and *assassinate* are synonyms and death is the result of both, this can be another mechanism of inference production.

Finally, synonyms and hyponyms give cause to entailments as well (Lafi, 2008: 3). A hyponym is "a word whose meaning is included in the meaning of another word" (Cambridge Dictionary). A case of hyponymy would be the following example regarding fruits. *I ate two apples and cherries. I ate fruit.* In this case, *apples* and *cherries* are hyponyms of the superordinate *fruit*. Consequently, the truth of the entailing sentence is equivalent to the truth of the inferred sentence, for apple and cherry are types of fruit. The falsity of the inferred sentence, in this case, would mean that the entailed sentence is also false (if somebody does not eat fruit, he/she cannot eat apples or cherries since they are types of fruits).

4.2.Pragmatic Inferences

Having dealt with instances of semantic inferences, we turn to pragmatic inferences, a group which is divided between presuppositions and implicatures. In this section these concepts are going to be explained and illustrated with the use of examples, and there is going to be also a summary of their most important features, also comparing them to

entailments. A pragmatic inference, as mentioned before, is attached to the form rather than to the meaning of what is said. An instance of pragmatic inference would be a conversational implicature, which is better exemplified in the following example:

A: Somebody is knocking on the door

B: I'm in the shower

In this example, the context in which this conversation is located and the knowledge of the world of the participants play a very important role in the understanding of the message that speaker B utters. Both sentences are apparently unconnected semantically; however, they have a close pragmatic relation. By this statement, speaker A is trying to order speaker B to open the door. Nonetheless, speaker B's real message is not that he is in the shower. He is trying to explain his inability to open the door, since that would convey going out of the shower.

This is one clear example of pragmatic inference; however, there are many other examples that are going to be mentioned and explained during the rest of the project, outlining the difference between presuppositions and implicatures. Notwithstanding, as mentioned above, the line and boundaries between a pragmatic inference and a semantic inference is not clear, and it is going to be exemplified later on.

4.2.1. Presuppositions

First of all, an attempt will be made to deal with the meaning of presuppositions and the main features they share. The majority of linguists locate presuppositions within the group of pragmatic inferences, although there seems to be a twist in this debate, about the issue whether they should be regarded as pragmatic or semantic. Potts (2015)

affirms that “this is because (at least some) presuppositions might be emergent from the at-issue meaning and its interactions with general pragmatic pressures, but also conventionalized”. An explanation of this dichotomy will be discussed later on, supported with the use of examples; nevertheless, my point is to follow the assumption that they are pragmatic inferences, so as to distinguish them from the type of semantic inferences explained before: entailments.

To understand this, it is necessary to explain what a presupposition is and also how it differs from the rest of inferences. As in the rest of the examples so far, inferences are messages that are not explicitly mentioned by the speaker yet deduced by the hearer. Presuppositions are implicit messages that the speaker deduces or assumes in order to give a meaning to the current sentence:

> Presuppositions are meanings that the speaker takes for granted and thus (acts as if she) assumes to be uncontroversial. Speakers might even go so far as to express certain pieces of information via presupposition triggers in order to signal what is and isn't up for debate. Thus, objecting to presuppositions can be difficult. (Potts, 2015: 3)

That is to say, they are not explicit messages, as advanced before, and therefore they are not debatable or arguable, for they are implicated by the speaker and deduced by the hearer. As mentioned above, one can take from discourse much more than what is mentioned explicitly, because in these cases, speakers implicate something that hearers must infer or deduce. The function of presuppositions is the same. To presuppose something means to assume it (Saeed, 1997: 101). For instance, in the statement *“Juan is ill again”* it is presupposed that he was ill before, as well as in the assertion *“Juan needed 7 years to finish his studies”* it is presupposed that Juan was a student and that he needed more time than the average to finish his studies (Renkema, 2004: 196) “Presuppositions are what is taken by the speaker to be the common ground

of the participants in the conversation" (Stalnaker, 1978: 321). In other words, speakers utter something that is supposed to be background or already known information to all the speakers in a communicative exchange, as in the example below:

A: My uncle is coming home from Canada.

B: How long has he been away for?

By answering the first statement with another question about it, B accepts the presupposition that A has an uncle (Brown and Yule, 1983: 29). Speaker B does not answer: *Do you have an uncle?*, but instead he asks how long has he been away for, accepting that A has an uncle that is coming home from Canada. At the same time, A presupposes that B already knows that he has an uncle, and, therefore, he does not have to specify it before saying that he is coming home from Canada. Thus, in this case, the speaker does not mention before that he has an uncle, and it seems that it is not needed in the conversation for speaker B to understand the fact that he is coming home from Canada.

Now, the following concern will be to address the different features of presuppositions, comparing them to entailments and seeing how they differ or to what extent they are similar. One major contrast between presuppositions and entailments is that presuppositions depend on the context where they are located, which means that they remain unaffected when the sentence is negated. Entailments, on the other hand, disappear when the entailing expression is negated. This property is known as *constancy under negation* (Brown and Yule, 1983: 29-30). Let us focus on the previous example of a presupposition and then compare it to an entailment.

A. My uncle is coming home from Canada.

B. My uncle is not coming home from Canada.

In both sentences, the presupposition would be that the speaker has an uncle, the difference would be that in example A he is coming home from Canada and in the example B he is not. The result is that a sentence (A) and its negative counterpart (B) share the same set of presuppositions. There is a way in which the speaker can deny the presupposition of the speaker in an aggressive way, although this is not the case in normal situations. There could be the case of the following statement: *My uncle is not coming from Canada because I do not have an uncle*, (and, therefore, it is impossible that he is coming from Canada, since he does not exist) (Brown and Yule, 1983: 30).

Saeed (1997) also proposed that if we negate a presupposition it survives. This is exemplified through the following example.

> I saw my father today/ I saw someone today – I did not see my father today/ I saw someone today

Constancy under negation can also be applied to more examples such as the next one:

> A: Juan is ill again.
>
> B: Juan is not ill again.

In both sentences, the presupposition that is shared is that Juan was ill before. In case A, he is saying that he is ill again (almost for the second time), and in case B he is trying to convey that he was ill but that this time he is not. Since it is a presupposition, it remains constant under negation. In entailments, it does not work like that. To explain that, let us use the example of an entailment that was used before:

> A: Shakespeare is the author of Hamlet.
>
> B: Hamlet was written by Shakespeare (Lafi, 2008: 3)

In this case, if we turn example B into a negative sentence (*Hamlet was not*

written by Shakespeare), example A has to be negative as well so as to have the same lexical meaning (*Shakespeare is not the author of Hamlet*). Consequently, entailments are a purely semantic relation for they represent a fixed- truth relation to the entailing expression (Lafi, 2008: 6).

Another property shared by presuppositions is *defeasibility*, or the cancelling of presuppositions, which is also present in many other pragmatic inferences. Saeed (1997) argues that "presuppositional behavior seems sensitive to context". In other words, a presupposition is defeasible if it disappears in some situation or context, and this is closely connected to the fact that presuppositions are located in the group of pragmatic inferences. To exemplify this property let us consider the following example.

A: Martha cried before finishing her degree

B: Martha died before finishing her degree

From the first sentence (A) it is presupposed that Martha finished her degree, and that she cried before finishing it. From the second sentence (B) it is deduced that Martha did not finish her degree, for she died first. Both sentences have the same syntactic structure; nevertheless, they give rise to extremely opposed presuppositions, and this happens because our knowledge of the world says that a dead person cannot finish a degree, so that the presupposition is blocked.

The following feature shared by presuppositions is *detachability*. This is related to the fact that presuppositions are attached to the form rather to the meaning of what is said. As will become clear later on, proper names, verbs of judgment, factive verbs and cleft sentences are presupposition-generating items. An inference is said to be detachable if it is possible to say the same thing in a different way (Lafi, 2008: 5). The next sentence is an instance that illustrates this principle well: *The paramilitary forces*

managed to rescue the victims of the flood. From that sentence, there are two other statements that can be deduced or presupposed:

A: The paramilitary forces tried to rescue the victims of the flood

B: The paramilitary forces rescued the victims of the flood.

As a conclusion, since presuppositions are more centered on the form than on the meaning, they can survive in a wide range of linguistic and extra-linguistic contexts, such as modal verbs (for instance with "should" or "ought to"), compound sentences (linked with connectors such as "and", "or" or "if") and negation.

Some authors, such as Potts (2015) and Horn and Ward (2004) argue that presuppositions can also have a semantic side; therefore, they distinguish between semantic and pragmatic presuppositions. "Pragmatic presuppositions are purely speaker actions, whereas semantic presuppositions deal with conventional aspects of the meanings of specific words and constructions" (Potts, 2015: 3) That is connected to the observation above that semantics is related to the lexical part of the word, to the meaning itself, and pragmatics to the speaker's actions, which transcend the boundaries of the semantic meaning. In this case, these authors affirm that presuppositions, conceived as pragmatic inferences by the majority of linguists, can also have a semantic interpretation. This is because, as mentioned before, in some aspects presuppositions may seem like entailments: "a fairly automatic relationship, involving no reasoning, which seems free of contextual effects" (Potts, 2015: 4). In other respects, though, presupposition may be sensitive to the context or utterance, for they are examples of extra-semantic rules that are more related to the context (pragmatics) than to the meaning of the words itself.

Semantic presuppositions, also called conventional or lexical, are part of the encoded meanings of specific words or constructions, which receive the name of *presupposition triggers* (Potts, 2015: 4). Presupposition triggers are presupposition generating linguistic items. We focus on these now:

Levinson (1983) distinguished several mechanisms that can create presuppositions. The first one is to use a referring expression that can be simple or compound. These expressions can be proper nouns, possessives, quantified noun phrases, etc. that give rise to 'presuppositions of existence'. Let us consider examples A and B below, discussed by Levinson himself:

A: Alexander is a staunch vegetarian

B: Alexander's car is the best of its class

In example A *(Alexander is a staunch vegetarian)* the proper name Alexander causes a presupposition of existence that is *Someone called Alexander exists* or *There is a person whose name is Alexander*. However, in sentence B *(Alexander's car is the best of its class)* the presupposed message is *Alexander owns a car* or *Alexander owns a good car*. In this example, what gives rise to the presupposition is the fact of possessing a car which is supposed to be the best of its class.

Another group of presuppositions is created due to the use of lexical items that are called *factive verbs* (such as *realise, know* or *regret*) or verbs of judgment (as for example, *blame*). These verbs, according to Levinson (1983), introduce another clause, which is supposed to be true, and the presupposition arises from that clause. An attempt will be made to make it more understandable through the following examples.

A: John regrets leaving the party so early yesterday evening

B: Mary blamed John for being so rude to the policeman

In the first sentence (A), the presupposition that arises is the following one: *John left the party early yesterday*. From that presupposition it could also be inferred that he would have stayed later in the party. If someone rejects something it means that it is a true act in the past that could not be changed in the present. The second sentence (B) is similar to the first one. The presupposition created from this one is that John was rude to the policeman.

Another type of presupposition trigger is *switch presuppositions* (Lafi, 2008: 3). These expressions are state verbs such as *stop* or *start* that indicate a new state or action or a change in that. "Such a verb describes a new state (or a kind of change in state), and simultaneously presupposes that the newly described state of affairs did not exist prior to the change" (Lafi, 2008: 3). In other words, the presupposition of these statements is that something new happened, something that has changed or something that is not going to happen anymore, as in the following instances:

A: I started to go to Madrid in summer

B: I stopped going to Madrid in summer

From the first sentence it is deduced that this speaker did not use to go to Madrid in summer; however, at a given time, the speaker changed this habit and at the present time he goes to Madrid in summer. Example B is the other way round. Somebody used to go to Madrid in summer, and he or she decided not to come back.

Cleft and pseudo-cleft constructions also create presuppositions. In some respects, they are also types of existential constructions that hold a different structure yet the same meaning. Examples of presuppositions regarding cleft and pseudo-cleft constructions are the following:

A: It was his arrogance that irritated me

B: What irritated me was his arrogance

From these two sentences, the same presupposition arises (*something irritated me*). Clefts are well-known for focussing the asserted part of the message on the post-copular element (*his arrogance* in the examples above) while relegating the information in the relative-like clause to the status of presupposed. These constructions, therefore, are also presupposition triggers.

Finally, and to conclude these examples of presupposition triggers recounted by Levinson (1983) it has to be said that subordinated clauses are also mechanisms for generating presuppositions. There are many types of subordinate clauses. Time and place adverbial clauses and comparative clauses as the following examples are the ones that are going to be subject of my analysis.

A: I received the package before I went to Barcelona (in this case, the presupposition is that he or she went to Barcelona). In this example, the presupposition arises from a time adverbial subordinate clause.

B: My sister broke her leg where I broke mine (in this case, the presupposition that is generated is that he/she broke a leg). Here, the presupposition is caused by a place adverbial subordinate clause.

C: He is more generous than you are (the presupposition that arises from this sentence is that this person is generous). In this case, the construction is a comparative one.

Having dealt with this kind of pragmatic presuppositions, it is worth mentioning that even semantic presuppositions can be pragmatic, inasmuch as they must be evaluated in the discourse participants' shared knowledge or common ground; most

presuppositions hold only in specific co-texts, so it is necessary to know the background information to evaluate them, as in the examples above (Potts, 2015: 4).

However, Stalnaker (1978), Brown and Yule (1983), Lafi (2008) et al., among others, approached the visualization of presuppositions in a different way than Potts, and they concluded in that all presuppositions should be understood in pragmatic terms; as a result, they were included in this project in the group of pragmatic inferences.

4.2.2. Implicatures

The last concept that we need to deal with is the notion of implicature. It deviates from entailments and presuppositions in many ways; however, the three of them are used to convey something which is not directly said. First of all, it is important to say that implicature is another instance of pragmatic inference, as well as presuppositions. As it is going to be explained later on, presuppositions and implicatures share some of their properties; however, they are considered different notions since they also differ in some respects. Whereas presuppositions are inferences regarding background assumptions, implicatures stand for what is implicated rather than assumed (Lafi, 2008: 9)

To begin with, the term implicature is related to what a hearer can infer or suggest from what the speaker says implicitly (Brown and Yule, 1983: 31) Implicatures, thus, are also pragmatic aspects of meaning and they can be emanated from the literal meaning of an utterance in a given context shared by speaker and hearer. The notion of implicature was first introduced by Grice (1975) to convey that in a conversational interaction the person who speaks usually means more than what it is said. An implicature arises, according to Haugh (2002) when the following process occurs:

1. One speaker (A) says a particular utterance (X)
2. This speaker (A) believes that by saying this utterance, the addressee or hearer (B) can think something else (Y) that is not explicitly mentioned in the message (X)
3. The hearer (B) thinks something else in addition to message that the speaker utters (and this 'something else' is the implicature itself)

Leaving this theoretical explanation aside, the functioning of implicatures may be illustrated with the support of the following example.

A: Can you lend me 5 dollars?

B: My purse is in the hall.

In this communicative exchange, by saying that his purse is in the hall, speaker B is answering positively to the question that A asked. The speaker believes that by saying that, the hearer would interpret the extra meaning that he can lend him some money. Therefore, the implicature of this conversation is: yes. That is, the hearer creates a different yet true representation of the linguistic proposition according to his own knowledge and what he understood by the speaker's answer, and this occurs because speakers mean more than what they actually say.

As Grice (1975) argues, what is said is the meaning of an utterance "after semantic decoding, reference resolution, indexical fixing and disambiguation" Therefore, he used the word *say* when what somebody says holds a close relation to the conventional meaning of the words uttered. In order to deal with a more in depth analysis of implicatures, it is crucial to mention the role of the conversational maxims and of the different types of implicature that exist, since many differences exist between

the two main types of implicatures: conversational implicatures and conventional implicatutres.

4.2.2.1.The Cooperative Principle and The Conversational Maxims

To understand Paul Grice's Theory of Conversational Maxims, it is highly important to explain the so called Cooperative Principle, since the basis of Pragmatics is centred on that. The Cooperative Principle lies on the assumption that the speaker should "make a conversational contribution such as is it required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which somebody is engaged" (Imanuddin, 2008: 2). In other words, members of a communicative exchange should adapt themselves to the compliance of a set of rules called the Conversational Maxims in order to maintain a successful conversation. Grice proposed this principle because it is believed that all members in a conversation should use language in a simple way and with the maximum degree of effectiveness to communicate with each other. Human beings have an unerring tendency to be cooperative in conversations; only machines (as in artificial intelligence, for instance) would find the two formally unconnected sentences of examples A and B above to be pragmatically unconnected. The Cooperative Principle is notoriously absent in legal discourse, for instance, which goes to explain why the language of the law is virtually opaque to normal language users and why it requires armies of specialist interpreters to decipher it: lawyers (Pinker, 1984: 222 ff.)

This principle is quite easier to understand if it is explained through the following example:

A: I'm running out of petrol.

B: There is a garage around the corner.

In this case, if B is obeying the Cooperative Principle, the garage should be open and full of petrol. This conversation would be successful if speaker A understands the same that B is trying to convey with his message. This contribution is called *conversational implicature*. This principle states the following:

> Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged (Grice, 1975: 45)

The Cooperative Principle, therefore, is believed to be followed by all members in a communicative exchange so as to implement effective communication. This principle is based, as said before, on the application and compliance of a set of norms which are called the Conversational Maxims, a kind of 'tacit agreement' by speakers and listeners to cooperate in communication (Grice, 1975). These maxims are organized as follows:

- Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange). Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
- Quality: Do not say what you believe to be false. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
- Relation: Be relevant.
- Manner: Be perspicuous, avoid obscurity of expression, avoid ambiguity, be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity) and be orderly (Brown and Yule, 1983: 32)

As Grice (1975) and Levinson (2000) suggest, the maxims of the Cooperative

Principle are not arbitrary, 'but rather describe rational means for conducting co-operative exchanges'. That is, implicatures are created because of the assumptions that hearers in a communicative exchange take from the speaker's attitude. The conversational maxims may help participants in a communicative exchange derive implicatures (Renkema, 2004: 19). These can be classified into three main groups or categories according to the speaker's attitude towards the maxims (Grice, 1975):

The first group comprises implicatures that arise from the observance of the conversational maxims; they are therefore, examples in which no maxim is violated. An example of this category would be the garage example.

A: I am out of petrol

B: There is a garage round the corner

In the previous example, speaker B is not violating any of the maxims, since he is being as informative as required according to this communicative exchange. When speaker B says that there is a garage round the corner, the implicature that A has to deduce is that the garage is open and that petrol is sold there. The maxim would not be successful if the garage was closed, for instance; and, therefore, the message conveyed would not be the same.

The second category is composed by implicatures arising from the violation of one or more than one maxim. An example of this group is the following one:

A: Where does Martin live?

B: Somewhere in the south of France

By answering that, B is violating the maxims of relation and manner, since he is not being relevant enough. The implicature arising is that B does not know exactly where Martin lives, and, therefore, he answers something quite ambiguous, since he can live either in Toulouse or in Montpellier, for instance, which are cities that are not close to each other.

> Indeed, sometimes we may choose to distance ourselves still further from communicative norms and deliberately violate the maxims: liars, tricksters, ironists and cheats thrive in the ambience of the socially expected. (Bennoti and Blackburn, 2014: 6)

This last group consists of implicatures arising from the flouting or exploitation of a maxim. Sometimes, the speaker flouts the maxims of the Cooperative Principle on purpose in order to make the hearer be aware of that (Paltridge, 2012: 64). This usually happens in cases of irony or metaphors, when what the speaker says is not what he actually thinks. Therefore, a maxim is violated only at the level of 'what is said'. In this case, Grice (1975) proposed one example of sarcasm to explain the purpose of this kind of implicatures. Speaker A and speaker B are in the street, and then, another person (C) passes by and speaker A comments "*look, there's your friend*". Speaker B obviously knows that it is an ironic statement, since C is not their friend, and, what is more, they are not friends at all, and, therefore, this message is interpreted as a joke. In this case, A violated purposely the maxims and, by doing that, he intended B to be aware of that. This is a mechanism of irony or sarcasm that A uses; so that, B infers thanks to his knowledge of the world that A is referring to a person they do not get on well with, although this is not directly said by A. Another example of this type is a flouting of the maxim of quality in the following conversation:

> A: Tehran's in Turkey, isn't it, teacher?

B: And London's in Armenia, I suppose

From this exchange, the student must deduce that Teheran is not in Turkey for London is not in Armenia either. By saying that, the speaker is trying to make the hearer understand that his message is ironic. Therefore, the speaker is blatantly failing to fulfill the maxim of quality (Grice, 1975: 48).

4.2.2.2.Conversational Implicature

The implicatures that belong to this first group are clearly pragmatic notions. A conversational implicature is the extra-meaning that is connected to the sense of the utterance (Lafi, 2008:9). That is to say, it is a further message that can be deduced from a sentence. As noted above, it is related to what the speaker implicates (which is opposed to what he actually says).

Conversational implicatures, according to Grice (1975) and Brown and Yule (1983) arise from the Cooperative Principle and the Conversational Maxims, as mentioned before, either because of the compliance with these norms or because of the disobedience of these rules. They derive from the presumption that two participants in a conversation are interacting according to the cooperative principle to reach "a common goal" (Horn and Ward, 2004: 6)

They are "highly contextualized inferences" (Bennoti and Blackburn, 2004: 3), because they are context dependent, they are not tied to any lexical word specifically, but either to the context itself, and that is why they are allocated in the pragmatic group of inferences, for they are non-lexical. If we focus on the following example, we will see that the implicature created does not arise from any particular word of the message,

but either from the context itself.

A: Would you like to come to the cinema tonight?

B: I have to prepare a project for tomorrow

From this exchange, speaker A should infer from B's message that he is going to be busy and, therefore, he cannot go with him to the cinema. This implicature is not originated because of the lexical meaning of any particular word of B's answer, but rather from the message itself in general, and also because of the knowledge of the world and commonsense that speaker A has. That is, it is "not literally said by the speaker but it is inferred by the hearer from what the speaker has said and their manner of saying it in a particular context" (Haugh, 2002: 128) The message "*I cannot go tonight"* is not literally said by speaker B; however, A interprets the message with this extra-meaning, since what B means is much more communicative than what he actually says. No human is expected to have problems with the derivation of these missing links or information, but certainly, this ability that comes up so cheap to us proves to be an insurmountable mountain for computers, which are unable of understanding such implied language.

All conversational implicatures share some common features that make them belong to the same group of inferences. As Haugh (2002) et al. argue, conversational implicatures are defeasible, which means that they could be negated or denied later on in the conversation. To exemplify that, the previous example of the invitation to the cinema will be used. Speaker A asks speaker B to go to the cinema, and speaker B answers that he has to prepare a project for the following day, implying that he would not go to the cinema. Nevertheless, if speaker B adds later on *I have to prepare a project for tomorrow, but I will finish early,* he is somehow cancelling the previous

implicature that he cannot go to the cinema.

Another example of this property would be the example of the purse used before. Speaker A asks speaker B if he would lend him some money and speaker B answers: 'my purse is in the hall' implying that he can take some money. This implicature can also be denied if speaker B added *My purse is in the hall but I do not have money*, and this is deniable without contradiction, since what he says now is not opposed to what he had said before.

The second property is presented by Lafi (2008) as *non-detachability*. Implicatures, unlike presuppositions, are not tied to a particular lexical item, but rather to the semantic content of the utterance in general, they cannot be detached by changing the words of the utterance. Therefore, the words of the conversational implicature can be changed by synonyms and the conversational implicature would still have meaning. In the garage example, the word *garage* can be replaced by *petrol station* or *service station* and the conversational implicature would still have the same meaning.

Another property shared by conversational implicatures is *calculability*. According to Bennoti and Blackburn (2014), an implicature is said to be calculable when the listener is able to deduce and infer the implicature from the speaker's utterance. That is to say, if speaker A says *The phone is ringing* and speaker B answers *I am in the shower*, speaker A has to deduce from this statement that speaker B cannot take the phone since he is in the shower, which would be an extra meaning attached to the message that he is in the shower. It is said to be calculable because the listener is able to deduce the message that the speaker utters.

The following characteristic shared by conversational implicatures is *non-*

conventionality. As it is going to be explained later on, implicatures can also be conventional; however, conversational implicatures are not conventional, they are not part of the conventional meaning of the utterance that generates them (Lafi, 2008: 14). According to Potts (2015: 22), an implicature is conventional just in case "it is the result of the arbitrariness of the signs (lexical items, constructions)". This is closely tied to the previous feature, since in order to understand a conversational implicature, pragmatics must be taken into account. An example of this property would be the following example:

A: Where is John?

B: There's a yellow car in front of Susan's house

Speaker B is trying to convey here that John is the owner if the yellow car that is in front of Susan's house. Speaker A has to deduce that message, which is not conventional, but whose interpretation is based on the context and on the shared knowledge of the participants in the conversation.

Finally, conversational implicatures have potential indeterminacy and multiplicity of meanings. It is explained by Hirschberg (1985: 24) as follows: "A conversational implicatum is often a disjunction of several possible interpretations of an utterance and is often indeterminate". Lafi (2008) explains this feature with the following example: *Hani is a machine*. This example can have several and many different meanings, for example, that she is efficient or that she never stops working; however, it can also mean that she lacks of emotional touch. This is basically what many authors mean by indeterminacy.

All in all, conversational implicatures are not so close to the lexical system (as

opposed to other types of inferences), but they are "a type of behaviour exemplified by agents with intentions and goals" (Benotti and Blackburn, 2014: 4). That is to say, as explained before, they are dependent on the context and the knowledge of the participants in the conversation.

4.2.2.3.Conventional Implicature

Conventional implicatures are another type of inference that must be taken into account when the topic of implicit language is arisen. Grice (1975) distinguished these implicatures because the message is implied due to "the conventional meaning of the words used". Therefore, this group of implicatures does not belong to the pragmatic part, but it is closer to semantics.

One instance of this group would be the following one: *He is an Englishman, he is, therefore, brave*. In this example, the implicature is that because of the fact that he is an Englishman, he is brave, and that all Englishmen should be brave. The implicature is, thus, tied to the conventional meaning of the word 'therefore', since it is what joins both utterances together (he is an Englishman- he is brave). This group of implicatures have more in common with entailments and presuppositions than what they share with conversational implicatures, since they are created because of the lexical meaning of the words in an utterance; in the previous case, the connector 'therefore'. Sometimes, according to Grice (1975), the conventional meaning of these words can help to determine what is implicated, as in the case before. Because of that, this information is not implicated, but understood from the conventional meaning of the word itself (Frapolli and Villanueva, 2007: 130)

Conventional implicatures, unlike conversational implicatures, cannot be cancelled (Frapolli and Villanueva, 2007: 128). This is because conventional implicatures are attached to the meaning of the words of the utterance. If we take the previous example, the implicature is that because of the fact that he is an Englishman he is brave. In conventional implicatures, this cannot be denied afterwards, since it is actually confirmed in the meaning of the words itself.

There are some other expressions that cause conventional implicatures, such as 'too, also, even', for instance. An example would be the following one: *Even Ken knows that*. In this example, what is conventionally implicated because of the term 'even' is that Ken is the least likely to know that. It is conventionally implicated because the implicature arises from the meaning of one specific word in the utterance and not from the context in general.

5. EXPERIMENT

The present study seeks to gather a sample of some of instances of implied language used in real conversations and dialogues by the characters of the American TV series *Atypical*. This series is about a year in the life of a teenager whose name is Sam Gardner. Sam studies his last year of High School and he also works in *Techtropolis*, an appliance store. As a teenager, he wishes to discover all the changes of this period, and he wants to be more independent from his parents and also to know more about girls, something that quite motivates him. Nevertheless, his mother is overprotective and believes that due to his autism he cannot carry out a normal life. Therefore, she always forces Casey, Sam's little sister, to be in charge of him. Things start to change when Sam's parents get divorced, her sister moves to another school since she obtains an athletic scholarship and he meets a girl. These events make him feel more self-confident and he also starts to be independent.

From the two seasons analysed, there were almost one hundred of instances of implied language (c.f. Appendix); therefore, a selection was made of the most representative examples of each kind just to illustrate the concepts explained in the previous sections. First of all, the total number will be shown in a table and percentages of the use of these mechanisms will be calculated, both in isolated sentences and as part of a conversation. Then, such samples are going to be explained and classified according to the prior arrangement, following the categories of entailment, presupposition, conventional implicature and conversational implicature.

5.1.Results

To begin with, it is worth mentioning the fact that there are, as it can be seen in the last part (c.f. Appendix), a great number of instances of implicit messages in real life conversations. First of all, it has to be said that the most prominent inference making mechanism is presupposition, since most of what the speaker does not say directly in a conversation is presupposed by the hearer. Let us see the results in a more visual way, using two illustrative tables, just to compare in a schematic way the frequency of use of each type of mechanism and also when they occur (focusing on the participants involved).

Implied Messages	**Entailments**	**Presuppositions**	**Conversational Implicatures**	**Conventional Implicature**	**Total**
Number	3	31	25	3	62

Isolated sentences (1 participant)	**Part of a conversation (between two or more participants)**	**Total**
22	40	62

From this table, we get to know that the majority of instances belong to the groups of presuppositions and conversational implicatures, 31 and 25 examples, respectively. It corresponds with the 50% in presuppositions and the 40,32% in conversational implicatures. On the other hand, both entailments and conventional implicatures trigger the least number of examples, both a 4,83% of the total. This results show that the majority cases belong to pragmatic inferences, which means that our propositions are affected by the context, and that implied messages do not depend on one lexical word in the sentence, buy on the context itself. Moreover, the majority of examples (c.f. Appendix) belong to a conversation (64,51%), which means that implicit language tends

to occur in multiparty conversations, whereas the minority of cases occur in isolated sentences only produced by one speaker (35,48%). In the following sections, some of these examples are going to be classified and explained, following the theoretical part.

5.2. Entailments

To begin with, an attempt will be made to provide one real example of the concept of entailment. Entailments, as explained above, are logical consequences or natural deductions that arise from a message, and that belong to the group of semantic inferences. From this type there were fewer examples than from the rest, probably due to the fact that conversations between two or more participants are more focused on the pragmatic side, which was the main focus of this research. The unique example analysed is the following one:

> Sam, it's the first night I've ever been apart from you.[1]

As in every entailment, there is an entailing sentence, such as the prior one, and the inferred sentence, which is the following one: *We have been always sleeping together until today*. According to the types of entailments explained before, this is a case of paraphrase construction, since both sentences have the same meaning yet different construction, due to the use of different words and expressions.

Following the main features of entailments we can see that the truth of the entailing sentence guarantees the truth of the entailed sentence. In the same way, the falsity of one (*It's not the first night I've been apart from you*) would imply the falsity

[1] RASHID, R. (2017): *Atypical*. Sony Pictures Television, Netflix, United States.

of the other one (since that would mean that they would not have been sleeping together always).

5.3. Presuppositions

Presuppositions, as already explained, are different types of inferences; they belong to the pragmatic type. This is the most prominent and usual inference creating mechanism, since the great majority of examples of implied language found in this project belong to this type. Presuppositions are meanings that the speaker takes for granted from a specific context, which are created, as mentioned above, due to many different constructions. An attempt will be made in order to divide the most important examples of presuppositions found into different sub-types.

First of all, let us focus on *switch presuppositions*, compounded, as mentioned above, by state verbs such as *stop* or *start* that indicate a new state or action or a change in that. An explanation of the following example would clarify this concept:

> We never should have stopped inviting you on those trips[2]

From this example, a presupposition arises (*They have stopped inviting them and they are repentant now*). It is deduced that somebody used to invite other people to their trips, and, due to any reason, they stopped doing it, and, at the present time, they do not go together. Presuppositions are more centred on the form than on the meaning; therefore, they can survive a wide range of linguistic and extra-linguistic contexts, such as modal verbs (in the example it appears *should*) and negation (also present in the example).

[2] Ibid

The next example that is going to be analysed belongs to the subordinate constructions, more specifically comparative constructions, which are also mechanisms for generating presuppositions:

I need her more than you do[3]

In this case, as mentioned in the theoretical part above, presuppositions can also appear in subordinate constructions, in this case, comparative constructions. This is a clear case in point, since the sentence is a comparative of superiority (*more than*), which triggers the following implicit message (*you don't need her*) due to the use of this expression and the context. What we take from this instance is that subordinate constructions are also presupposition generating items. From this group of subordinates, there are also more instances of different constructions, such as the following one: an adverbial clause. Let us consider that with the following example.

The next instance of presupposition also belongs to the group of subordinate constructions; however, in this case, it belongs to the group of place adverbial subordinate clauses. As in the example proposed in the theoretical part (*My sister broke her leg where I broke mine)*, the next example also triggers another meaning related to a place where two things occurred, although only one is mentioned explicitly.

She was born in New Jersey, in the same town as Queen Latifah[4]

In this example there are two messages. The first one is that the person who is speaking is talking about a girl who was born in New Jersey (something which is mentioned explicitly by the statement *She was born in New Jersey*). Nevertheless, there

[3] Ibid

[4] Ibid

is also another message which is deduced by the hearer yet not directly expressed by the speaker (*Queen Latifah was born in New Jersey*). This presupposition survives to a wide range of contexts, such as negation, for instance. If we turn the sentence into a negative one (*She was not born in New Jersey, unlike Queen Latifah*) the presupposition that arises (*Queen Latifah was born in New Jersey*) does not differ from the previous one. This presupposition is also defeasible, since it disappears in some contexts, for example in the following examples:

She was born in New Jersey, in the same town as Queen Latifah

She died in New Jersey, in the same town as Queen Latifah

Both sentences have the same syntactic structure; nevertheless, they give rise to extremely opposed presuppositions. In the first example, the presupposition that arises is that Queen Latifah was born in New Jersey, as mentioned before. In the second case, there are two presuppositions that arise. The first one is that Queen Latifah died in New Jersey, and the second one, quite obvious thanks to our knowledge of the world, is that Queen Latifah is not alive.

Finally, the last case of presuppositions that is going to be analysed is the next one, belonging to a mixture between a referring expression and a comparison.

My dad built an igloo. Way better than his last one[5]

In this example, it is said explicitly that the father of the person who is speaking built an igloo (this is the explicit part of the message). There is also a part which is not directly expressed yet deduced because of the sentence *way better than his last one*. The message that arises is that he built one before and that this last one was not good enough. This is a clear example of presupposition since it also survives negation, since

[5] Ibid

the presupposition does not arise from a specific word but from the meaning of the sentence in general. If we turn the sentence into a negative (*My dad built an igloo. It is not better than his last one*), the presupposition that arises does not change, since it is as well deduced that he built another one before.

5.4.Conversational implicatures

This group belongs to a highly contextualized case of inferences, in which the implicit message does not arise from the semantics of the clause but from the context in which the statement is placed. All the examples found belong to the group of implicatures generated from the observance of the maxims- in which no maim is violated-, since there are no cases of irony or sarcasm that led to a flout or violation of the Cooperative Principle. Let us see some examples taken from real conversations so as to analyse how they work in a more realistic fashion.

A: Would you like to go on a date with me?

B: Tonight I'm busy, but that's so nice[6]

From this communicative exchange, speaker A should infer from B's message that he is going to be busy and, therefore, he cannot go on a date with him. This implicature, as said before, is not detached to the lexical meaning of any particular word of B's answer, but rather to the message in general and the knowledge of the world and commonsense that speaker A has (this is related to the feature of non-detachability). Due to the fact of being busy, it is expected that she will not have time to meet A. Nevertheless, one of the features of the conversational implicatures is that they are cancellable; that is to say, they can be negated after pronouncing them and they still

[6] Ibid

survive. Let us see it in this example above. From B's answer it is understood that she cannot go on a date; however, it can be cancelled (*Tonight I'm busy, but when I finish what I have to do I can meet you*).

Another example quite similar to the one below, in which there is also a proposition asked by speaker A, and speaker B's answer conveys an implicature.

> A: Hi. So, I saw that we had a biology test coming up and, I don't know, I was just thinking that maybe we could study together
>
> B: Why would I want to do that? I'm getting an "A" in Biology and you're getting an "A" minus. That would not benefit me at all[7]

In this case, the implicature that arises from B's answer is that he does not want to study with speaker A, since it is directly said that studying with her would not benefit him at all. As in the previous example, this implicature is not retrieved from any particular word or expression but from the context in general. It can be negated as well, if speaker B says that despite the fact of getting better marks than A, he would like to study with her: (e.g. *I'm getting an "A" in Biology and you're getting an "A" minus. That would not benefit me at all. However, I would like to study with you because you seem a nice person and I would like to help you*). In this case, the implicature that arose before is cancelled. The next example of implicature found is the following one:

> A: Want another drink?
>
> B: I think I've escaped my real life long enough[8]

From this example, it can be seen an explicature (*I think I've escaped my real life long enough*) and also an implicature (*Drinking makes me to escape my real life. I do not want another drink*). This implicature, as well as the rest of the implicatures

[7] Ibid
[8] Ibid

analysed, is understood thanks to the knowledge of the world of speaker A, who understands that B does not want another drink because she did not want to escape from her real life either. However, it can also be cancelled since speaker B may want to escape from her real life by drinking (*I think I've escaped my real life long enough but I don't mind, I want another drink*). Here, the implicature that arises is just the opposite (speaker B wants another drink to escape from her real life).

The last implicature analysed is the following one:

A: Did you vacuum the rug?

B: I woke up early[9]

In this case, from B's message we can retrieve an explicature (the fact that she woke up early), which is explicitly mentioned in the text, and an implicature (*Yes, I did vacuum the rug*), which is an implicit message connected to the fact of waking up early, since one message triggered the other one. As in the rest of the cases, this implicature is not tied to the lexical meaning of any particular word in the sentence, but to the context and the shared knowledge of the participants. Nevertheless, this implicature can also be cancelled (*I woke up early but I did not vacuum the rug*), eliminating the previous implicature caused by the original statement.

5.5. Conventional implicatures

Finally, conventional implicatures, belonging to the semantic type, as well as entailments, also appear many instances in the dialogues analysed. These instances are easily identifiable, since they arise from the lexical meaning of the words in an utterance. Three different examples will be provided and analysed:

[9] Ibid

My cousin works at a car wash, therefore he knows all about girls.[10]

From this message, quite similar to one provided above in the theoretical part, it can be retrieved an inference via deductive principles: people who work at a car wash know everything about girls. The connective *therefore* provides a link between two utterances: my cousin works at a car wash/ he knows all about girls. These sentences are apparently unrelated messages; however, the placement of this word, which is a linking that denotes consequence, leads to a relation between the fact of working at a car wash and knowing all about girls. Once this message is uttered, people who are hearing the message could wonder what the connection between these facts is. It could be either due to the fact that he works with many girls, so that he knows them quite good or because he works with people that understand about girl's issues. Whatever the case, the lexical meaning of the word *therefore* is what triggers the inference in this case in particular. It is distinguished from a presupposition because this cannot be denied afterwards, since it is confirmed in the meaning of the words itself. If we said "my cousin works at a car wash, therefore he does not know anything about girls", the implicature would change, since working at a car wash would not be related to knowing all about girls, but the opposite.

The second example analysed is the next one, also triggered by a connective adjunct.

I'm black, so they put me on the brochures[11]

In this instance, as well as in the example above, two apparently unrelated sentences (I'm black- they put me on the brochures) are linked with a connective *so*, creating a conventional implicature, an additional message (*Black people tend to appear on*

[10] Ibid
[11] Ibid

brochures). In this case, like in the previous one, the lexical meaning of the item so is what triggers the conventional implicature, and not the context itself- and this is why this is a semantic inference. It belongs to this group because it does not survive under negation. If we turn this positive sentence into a negative one, it does not have the same implicature (*I'm not black so they put me in brochures* or *I'm black, so they do not put me on brochures*). From these two messages, the implicature that would arise is just the opposite than in the previous case (the relation between being black and appear on brochures would not exist in these examples, or, in other words, it would exist but it would be a contrary relation than in the previous one).

The final example of conventional implicatures that is going to be subject of my analysis is the following one:

> Even Sharice turned against me.[12]

This sentence also conveys an additional message attached to the word 'even', which is that Sharice is the last person she believes she would turn against her, and that even though, she did it. This is allocated into the group of conventional implicatures since the inference created is not dependent on the context in general, but of the specific meaning of a word, in this case, *even*. This term is usually employed to emphasize something that is quite surprising; in this case, the fact that Sharice turned against her, which is surprising because they were supposed to be close friends. As explained in the previous example as well, it cannot be denied, for the meaning of the implicature would change from the original one. In this case, if we turn the sentence into negative ("Even Sharice did not turn against me") the implicature was that she did not turned against her and, therefore, this sentence would not carry the same lexical meaning to the other one.

[12] Ibid

6. CONCLUSIONS

Throughout the present paper, an explanation and use of implied messages in real life conversations have been shown and exemplified in genuine dialogues between characters from a TV series. An attempt was made to distinguish, first of all, different yet closely related instances of inferences and illustrate them with the use of examples. To establish a connection between Discourse Analysis and Pragmatics was also a concern of the project, and they proved to be -as announced in the introductiont- two disciplines that go hand in hand, since both analyse language beyond the sentence level and the inseparability of the form and the purpose of communication. It has been acknowledged that sometimes messages are "conveyed by implication and retrieved by inferencing" (Saddock, 1978: 283). This quote, I think, summarises in a quite well-aimed way the purpose of this project, since it goes back to the prior dichotomy used from beginning to end of this project, that stated that "speakers implicate, hearers infer".

I focus now on a few of the most relevant results of my investigation. First of all, it was found that the thesis exposed from the beginning, that speakers mean more than they say, is a reality, since we use, both consciously and unconsciously, several inference creating mechanisms to communicate. From these mechanisms, a distinction should be made among them, as it was previously explained in the rest of the sections. First of all, entailments should be distinguished from the rest, since they trigger a literal meaning of the sentence, and they are the most visible semantic inference. Secondly, presuppositions are related to the meanings that the speaker takes for granted, since they are background assumptions or shared knowledge among participants, and thus code information that is assumed to be uncontroversial (Potts, 2015: 3). Finally, implicatures

convey an additional message which is not literally said but which is pertinent in order to understand a message. Therefore, a proposition expressed by an utterance can be entailed, presupposed or conversationally or conventionally implicated, since these are the inference generating mechanisms studied. All in all, we must acknowledge the fact that this behaviour is difficult to replicate in mechanisms of artificial intelligence and that we must to take into account global aspects of our cognitive system (such as the inferential capacity or the analysis of the hearer's brain in order to adapt our message) when we, as human beings, want to decipher certain messages.

Once a distinction among the major types has been established, it is essential to account for their use in real life, since, as explained above, some groups have a higher frequency of appearance than the rest. Let us summarise the main results. From the instances analysed, we can go as far as to say that there were a higher number of instances of presuppositions and conversational implicatures, which are the most pervasive mechanisms (both with more than a 40% of the total of examples). The presence of these processes arises from the fact that the majority of examples analysed come from dialogues between two or more participants, in which these mechanisms abound more. This could also be related to the fact that clearly pragmatic inferences, also named "highly contextualised inferences" by Bennoti and Blackburn (2004: 3), such as implicatures, are much more centred on the context itself than on the meaning of a particular term. On the other hand, clearly semantic inferences, such as entailments or conventional implicatures, are not so frequent in real life conversations, at least in the instances analysed, for they both show only less than a 5% from the total of implied messages.

To conclude, there were some limitations in this study, such as the following. First of all, as announced from the beginning, the boundaries between a semantic inference and a pragmatic one are not clearly demarcated. Some authors, as mentioned above,

include some of them in one group or another (as in the case of presuppositions and conventional implicatures). Therefore, it proved to be difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between these two groups, since interpretations vary among linguists. Secondly, it would be much more interesting to elaborate an accurate quantitative study of the frequency of appearance of implicatures in a real life conversation (via the use of a larger corpus), also with the use of more illustrative tables, such as the ones used above. This process, nevertheless, would have required a lot of time and space for the dissertation. Furthermore, it would also be interesting to explain why implicatures occur (from the types explained above, such as the observance of the maxims or the flouting of the maxims) and focus on the use of hedges and flouting or violating the maxims in cases of irony and sarcasm, for instance. The use of sarcasm and irony would be, as a consequence, a suggestion for possible further research in this field, since both processes are also instances of implied message, in which what the speaker says is frequently the opposite of what he/she is actually thinking. This study would contribute to a more exhaustive analysis of implied language in a more realistic fashion.

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Appendix: *Atypical* (selected dialogues)

Retrieved from: RASHID, R. (2017): *Atypical*. Sony Pictures Television, Netflix, United States.

A: Should we take another picture with Edison? I read online that girls love animals. Maybe like this

B: I think this might go quicker if you just leave.

Implied Messages (I.M. henceforth): 1. Edison is an animal. 2. We should not take another picture with him.

A: So, how's your week?

B: Well, I still don't have a date, and I scared a girl off from across the room, and we had meat loaf twice, and I hate meat loaf.

I.M.: 1. My week is not going very well.

A: When you make eye contact, you have to look away a bit

B: But how can I make eye contact and look away? I mean, I'm not a mantis shrimp

I. M.: 1. Mantis can do that, they can look to two different places at a time.

A: I'll take her to techtropolis

B: Take a girl to an appliance store?

A: I have to go where I'm comfortable

I.M: 1. Techtropolis is an appliance store. 2. I'm comfortable in Techtropolis.

A: I feel like I'm in college again

I.M: 1. I have already been in college before that.

A: Want another drink?

B: I think I've escaped my real life long enough

I.M: 1. Drinking makes me to escape my real life. 2. I do not want another drink.

A: You're funny. A kind of mean

B: Yeah, I'm always mean to people I like

I.M: 1. I like you.

A: Penguins met for life so penguins aren't like people

I.M: 1. People do not met for life.

A: Sometimes I wish I was smooth, like Zahid

I.M: 1. Zahid is smooth

A: You're wearing a sweatshirt?

B: What's wrong with it?

A: Nothing, I just don't understand why you do all that working out if you're not gonna flaunt your cute figure

I.M: 1. This sweatshirt does not fit in your figure.

A: Would you like to go on a date with me?

B: That's so nice, but I'm busy

A: Wait, I didn't tell you when the date is. Friday, 6 pm

B: I'm still busy

I.M: 1. I do not want to go on a date with you.

A: Aren't you afraid of getting hurt?

B: Well, not unless I date a great white shark

I.M: 1. White sharks can be harmful.

A: Cool shirt

B: Thanks […]

A: I was being sarcastic. You look stupid

B: […] Jacket or no jacket? […]

A: As many jackets as you can

I.M: 1. Your t-shirt is horrible, so, if you put a jacket on it, people won't see it.

A: Hi. So, I saw that we had a biology test coming up and, I don't know, I was just thinking that maybe we could study together

B: Why would I want to do that? I'm getting an "A" in Biology and you're getting an "A" minus. That would not benefit me at all

I.M: 1. I do not want to study with you.

A: I asked a girl out

B: Oh, I'm sorry

A: Why?

B: I assumed she said no

A: No, she said yes

B: Really? Oh, I'm sorry for her

I.M: 1. He is not really the perfect guy to date.

A: Are your parents cool with me coming to dinner? I'm pretty sure your dad hates me

B: Yeah, they're fine with it, 'cause they don't know

I.M: 1. My father hates you, and if he knew that you came he would not let it happen.

A: You been smoking around my daughter'

B: Cigarettes? No

I.M: 1. He has been smoking something different than cigarettes.

A: Your shift ended 20 minutes ago. Is everything okay?

I.M: Why are you still here?

A: She was born in New Jersey, in the same town as Queen Latifah

I.M: 1. Queen Latifah was born in New Jersey.

A: Sam, are you okay with this?

B: I think it's dumb, but other people seem to be happy, mostly Paige

I.M: 1. I am not okay with this.

A: Dad, did mom used to touch all your stuff? How did you get her to stop?

B: I don't think I ever did

I.M: 1.Your mother is still touching all my staff.

A: Hey. You look familiar

B: I'm black, so they put me on the brochures

I.M: 1. Black people always appear in brochures.

A: She got upset because I didn't tell one of my mates about Sam's autism. But that's unfair, right?

B: You don't want me to take sides

I.M: 1. That is not unfair, she is right.

A: My cousin works at a car wash, therefore she knows all about girls

I.M: 1. People who work at a car wash knows all about girls.

A: Even Sharice turned against me

I.M: 1. Sharice is the last person she believes she would turn against her.

A: I'm such an idiot

B: I'm sure I've seen way more idiotic

I.M: 1. You are a bit idiot.

A: I have a free day tomorrow. Can I pick you up from school and we can go and get ice cream at Friendly's like we used to?

B: I have thinking to do, so being alone is ideal

I.M: 1. No.

A: I can't stop, I'm a machine (a garland-making machine)

I.M: 1. Machines work without stopping.

A: Did you break into my house with chocolate-covered strawberries?

B: No, the window was open. I just silently climbed in until my dad made me leave

I.M: 1. Yes, I did break into your house with chocolate-covered strawberries.

A: Dance with me

B: I only have two minutes and I don't like to slow dance

I.M: 1. No.

A: You okay?

B: My mom had an affair

I.M: 1. I'm not okay.

A: Sam, you okay?

B: It's Monday at 4 o'clock. I always see Julia on Mondays at 4 o'clock

I.M: 1. I not okay because I want to see Julia.

A: A hole the size of the state of Maine has been found in the middle of Antarctica

I.M: 1. The size of the Antarctica is quite larger than that of the state of Maine.

A: Where is old Dougy?

B: At my grandpa's cabin, building a dumb porch

A: In the middle of the winter?

I.M: 1. Porches are only used in summer.

A: I don't enjoy intimacy with strangers

B: We are very different people

I.M: 1. I do enjoy intimacy with strangers.

A: This is the tightest made bed I've ever felt were. You were in the military?

I.M: 1. People in the military are expert in making their bed.

A: Did you vacuum the rug?

B: I woke up early

I.M: 1. Yes, I did.

A: Sam, it's the first night I've ever been apart from you

I.M: 1. We have been always sleeping together.

A: An advice incoming, sit down

B: Good, I was hoping for this, I brought my notebook

I.M: 1. I use my notebook to write down all his advices.

A: I need her more than you do

I.M: 1. You don't need her.

A: You walk around with that in your shoes?

B: It helps my plantar fasciitis

I.M: 1. Yes, I do.

A: Baby? Do you have a kid?

B: Of course not. I'm not a moron. My mother is

I.M: 1. My mother is a moron because she has a baby.

A: And you run out of class?

B: It was too loud

I.M: 1. Yes, I did.

A: You're really good at lying

B: I learned everything I know from the Dark lord herself. Mom

I.M: 1. Mom lies a lot.

A: I don't know how to lie

B: You've come to the right place. How can I be of service?

I.M: 1. I am a liar and I can help you.

A: I need a bank account

B: Oh, and good day to you, Mr. Rockefeller

I.M: 1. Because he is rich.

A: It's nice and calm

B: Yes, you probably won't have another panic attack here

I.M: 1. You had another panic attack before.

A: So, how's Newton without Newton?

B: I don't know, I actually go to the technical school

A: But he's really smart

I.M.: 1. People at the technical school are not smart.

A: My dad built an igloo. Way better than his last one.

I.M.: The last one was not good enough.

A: These are my pop shoes, that way no one knows it's me in the bathroom, 'cause they don't see my shoes under the stall

B: Those look like Bob's shoes

A: Exactly

I.M: 1. Using these shoes people would think I'm Bob.

A: It's so impressive that you're practicing for college. I wish Zahid had gone to college

I.M: 1. Zahid did not go to college.

A: You're my favourite person, but don't tell Sharice 'cause she will kill you

I.M: 1. Sharice would like to be my favourite person.

A: We never should have stopped inviting you on those trips

I.M: 1. They have stopped inviting them.

A: Dude was like 88 years old, such a jerk, and smoke like a chimney

I.M: 1. Chimneys smoke. 2.He smoke quite a lot.

A: Can you give me a tattoo of that?

B: I don't have the appropriate training or equipment for that. And that room is definitely not sterile. I think I saw a cockroach the other day

I.M: 1. I don't want to do it.

A: Artists are supposed to be eccentric lunatics. You've seen that 'stache on Salvador Dali

I.M: 1. Salvador Dali is an eccentric lunatic because he is an artist.

A: Contrary to popular belief, being a successful explorer is not about being brave or even taking risks

I.M: 1. People believe that being a successful explorer means being brave and taking risks.

A: And if you are in Antarctica, warm socks

I.M: 1. In the Antarctica it's cold.

A: I have the 3rd highest GPA in the class. Paige has the highest, which is good because she's the one who has to give the speech, not me

I.M: 1. I do not want to give the speech.

B: Wait—Are you not wearing anything under there?

A: So? Zahid didn't

I.M: No, I'm not wearing anything under there